Budget constrained auctions with heterogeneous items
- 5 June 2010
- conference paper
- conference paper
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Proceedings of the 42nd ACM symposium on Theory of computing - STOC '10
- p. 379-388
- https://doi.org/10.1145/1806689.1806743
Abstract
No abstract availableOther Versions
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