Self-Serving Cheap Talk: A Test Of Aumann's Conjecture
- 1 November 2000
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier BV in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 33 (2), 177-194
- https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0776
Abstract
No abstract availableFunding Information
- Ministry of Education (D101-7715)
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