Formation of Alliances in Internet-Based Supply Exchanges
- 1 January 2005
- journal article
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 51 (1), 92-105
- https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0213
Abstract
In different industries, such as automobiles, chemicals, or retailing, competitors are joining forces in establishing electronic marketplaces to reduce inefficiencies in the purchasing process and cut costs by combining their buying power. Joining such an alliance leads to reduced costs, including those of possible rivals, because members share the development and operating costs. A company that joins an alliance agrees to share its suppliers with others, which may lead to more intense competition among the increased number of suppliers, and it may further benefit an alliance member at the expense of companies left outside the alliance. Natural questions that could arise, then, are when would a firm prefer to take part in an electronic marketplace joint venture; when would it prefer that other firms, possibly rivals, join the venture; and what are the financial consequences of either joining an alliance or remaining independent? In an attempt to gain a better understanding of the issues, we have developed a model of three retailers whose products may have a certain degree of substitutability. We provide some conditions, in terms of product substitutability and compatibility of retailers, that would lead to the formation of a three-member alliance, or a two-member alliance, or no alliance at all. We also study the effect of alliance structure and compatibility of retailers on the profit of a company.This publication has 8 references indexed in Scilit:
- Negotiation-proof Nash equilibriumInternational Journal of Game Theory, 2000
- Coalitional stability under perfect foresightEconomic Theory, 1998
- Farsighted Coalitional StabilityJournal of Economic Theory, 1994
- Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. ConceptsJournal of Economic Theory, 1987
- An Industry Equilibrium Analysis of Downstream Vertical IntegrationMarketing Science, 1983
- Cooperative games with coalition structuresInternational Journal of Game Theory, 1974
- 16. Acceptable Points in General Cooperative n-Person GamesPublished by Walter de Gruyter GmbH ,1959
- 3. Solutions to General Non-Zero-Sum GamesPublished by Walter de Gruyter GmbH ,1959