Stability property of matchings is a natural solution concept in coalitional market games
- 9 December 2009
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Science and Business Media LLC in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 39 (1-2), 237-248
- https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0206-1
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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