Goal Independent Central Banks: Why Politicians Decide to Delegate
- 1 January 2008
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier BV in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
A motivation for central bank independence (CBI) is that policy delegation helps politicians manage diverse coalitions. This paper develops a model of coalitionKeywords
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