An Empirical Model of Strategic Choice with an Application to Coordination Games
- 1 April 1999
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier BV in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 27 (1), 86-105
- https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0678
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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