Optimal Security Design and Dynamic Capital Structure in a Continuous‐Time Agency Model
Top Cited Papers
- 1 December 2006
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Finance
- Vol. 61 (6), 2681-2724
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.01002.x
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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