Performance Incentives within Firms: The Effect of Managerial Responsibility
- 15 July 2003
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Finance
- Vol. 58 (4), 1613-1650
- https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6261.00579
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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