The problem of defective desires
- 1 December 2005
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis Ltd in Australasian Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 83 (4), 487-504
- https://doi.org/10.1080/00048400500338690
Abstract
This paper defends the actualist desire-satisfaction theory of welfare against a popular line of objection—namely, that it cannot accommodate the fact that, sometimes, it is bad for a person to get what he wants. Ill-informed desires, irrational desires, base desires, poorly cultivated desires, pointless desires, artificially aroused desires, and the desire to be badly off, are alleged by objectors to be defective in this way. I attempt to show that each of these kinds of desire either is not genuinely defective or else is defective in a way fully compatible with the theory.Keywords
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