The choice of equity-selling mechanisms
- 6 May 2004
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier BV in Journal of Financial Economics
- Vol. 74 (1), 93-119
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2003.08.003
Abstract
This paper examines the impact of information asymmetry and monitoring of managers on the choice between public offerings and private placements. Three key findings emerge. First, private placement firms have higher information asymmetry than public offering firms. Second, private placement investors do not engage in more monitoring than public offering investors. Finally, discounts for private placements sold to managers are higher than discounts for private placements in which managers do not participate. The final two findings cast doubts on the widely held view that private placements are motivated by a demand for enhanced monitoring.Keywords
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