Institutional Investor Activism in a Context of Concentrated Ownership and High Private Benefits of Control: The Case of Italy
- 1 January 2013
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier BV in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 47 references indexed in Scilit:
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