“Not Just for the Money?” How Financial Incentives Affect the Number of Publications at Danish Research Institutions
- 3 March 2008
- journal article
- symposium on-public-service-motivation
- Published by Taylor & Francis Ltd in International Public Management Journal
- Vol. 11 (1), 28-47
- https://doi.org/10.1080/10967490801887889
Abstract
Do public employees work “for the money?” Do financial incentives determine their work effort? The literature gives conflicting answers, but Frey ( 1997 Frey , B. S. 1997 . Not Just for the Money. An Economic Theory of Personal Motivation . Cheltenham and Brookfield : Edward Elgar Publishing. [Google Scholar] ) offers a possible explanation: If financial incentives are perceived as supportive, they can “crowd in” intrinsic motivation and increase the work effort. But if financial incentives are perceived as controlling, the intrinsic motivation is “crowded out,” and the work effort decreases with increasing financial incentives to work. However, the empirical evidence concerning Frey's proposition is limited, and our article aims to fill part of this gap. We investigate how the introduction of financial incentives to publish affects the number of publications at 162 Danish research institutions (17 government research institutions and subunits of 10 universities) when the perception of the incentives is taken into account. The results show that the more supportive employees consider the incentives to be, the more financial incentives motivate researchers to increase publication.Keywords
This publication has 37 references indexed in Scilit:
- Evaluations: Hidden Costs, Questionable Benefits, and Superior AlternativesSSRN Electronic Journal, 2006
- Order with Some Law: Complementarity versus Substitution of Formal and Informal ArrangementsJournal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2004
- Fairness and Incentives in a Multi‐task Principal–Agent ModelThe Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2004
- The motivation and behaviour of hospital TrustsSocial Science & Medicine (1982), 2004
- The politics of publicationNature, 2003
- Trust and Incentives in Principal-Agent NegotiationsJournal of Theoretical Politics, 2002
- Motivation Crowding TheoryJournal of Economic Surveys, 2001
- Knights, Knaves and Gnashers: Professional Values and Private DentistryJournal of Social Policy, 2000
- Changing remuneration systems: effects on activity in general practice.BMJ, 1990
- MAKING POLICY BY TRIAL AND ERROR: MERIT PAY IN THE FEDERAL SERVICE1Policy Studies Journal, 1988