The power of randomness in Bayesian optimal mechanism design
- 31 May 2015
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier BV in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 91, 297-317
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.08.010
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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Funding Information
- NSF Awards (CCF-0830494, CCF-0643763)
- Sloan Foundation Fellowship
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