The Case for Fundamentally Different Existential-Humanistic Psychologies
- 1 April 1989
- journal article
- research article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Humanistic Psychology
- Vol. 29 (2), 249-262
- https://doi.org/10.1177/0022167889292008
Abstract
The thesis is that a strong case may be made in favor of fundamentally different existential-humanistic psychologies. Four arguments are offered, the first two of which set aside traditional reasons for preserving a single existential-humanistic psychology. The third argument holds that there are fundamentally different existential-humanistic positions on basic questions having to do with human personality and change. The fourth argument is that significantly different programs of practical implications and applications are generated by fundamentally different existential-humanistic psychologies. As a package, these four arguments support the thesis of fundamentally different existential-humanistic psychologies.Keywords
This publication has 8 references indexed in Scilit:
- An Experiential Session with Edward and His "Obsessional" Thoughts and FearsThe Psychotherapy Patient, 1987
- The Care and Feeding of AbrasivenessThe Psychotherapy Patient, 1984
- The treatment of cancer through experiential psychotherapy.Psychotherapy, 1980
- The therapist–patient relationship: Conceptual analysis and a proposal for a paradigm-shift.Psychotherapy, 1978
- Infant psychotherapy: Theory, research, and practice.Psychotherapy, 1976
- Personal life change through systematic use of dreams.Psychotherapy, 1971
- Childhood Determinants of Adult Functioning: Strategies in the Clinical Research Use of the Personal-Psychological HistoryThe Psychological Record, 1969
- The Onset of StutteringThe Journal of General Psychology, 1962