Misunderstanding African politics: corruption & the governance agenda

Abstract

Political corruption ‐ the misuse of public office or public responsibility for private (personal or sectional) gain ‐ has been an important theme of the neo‐liberal policies of adjustment, conditionality and democratization in Africa. Having identified the state as ‘the problem’, and liberalization and democratization as ‘the solution’ to that problem, it was inevitable that efforts to eradicate and control the widespread corruption characterising post‐colonial politics would be given a high priority by ‘the donors’. From the outset, proponents of structural reform linked political corruption to authoritarianism as an explanation of developmental failure, thereby identifying the arguments for democratization and ‘good governance’ with those for liberalization. This paper explores the way in which corruption has been understood in this ‘governance’ agenda and the efforts that have been made to control it by improving institutional performance and policing ‐ greater transparency and accountability, more effective oversight and punishment ‐ and by building a political culture intolerant of corruption. In general, however, legal and administrative reform has produced disappointing results and corruption has flourished and even increased. Failure has compounded cynicism and weakened faith in democratic change. Such failures suggest: firstly, that the anti‐corruption strategies pursued by international donors and imposed on African debtors are inadequate because of weaknesses in their conception of the state; secondly, that the reforms introduced through liberalization (a weakening of the state, deregulation and privatization) create new conditions in which corruption can flourish; and, thirdly, that fundamental features of African politics will need to change before such anti‐corruption measures can hope to succeed.