Reputation in Auctions: Theory, and Evidence from eBay
- 27 April 2006
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 15 (2), 353-369
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2006.00103.x
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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