Say-on-Pay in a Context of Concentrated Ownership. Evidence from Italy
Preprint
- 1 January 2014
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier BV in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
We investigate say-on-pay (SOP) voting outcomes in a country (Italy) where ownership structure is concentrated by regressing shareholder dissent on a comprehensThis publication has 56 references indexed in Scilit:
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