Reactive strategies in indirect reciprocity
- 7 April 2004
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier BV in Journal of Theoretical Biology
- Vol. 227 (3), 299-314
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2003.11.008
Abstract
Evolution of reactive strategy of indirect reciprocity is discussed, where individuals interact with others through the one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma game, changing their partners in every round. We investigate all of the reactive strategies that are stochastic, including deterministic ones as special cases. First we study adaptive dynamics of reactive strategies by assuming monomorphic population. Results are very similar to the corresponding evolutionary dynamics of direct reciprocity. The discriminating strategy, which prescribes cooperation only with those who cooperated in the previous round, cannot be an outcome of the evolution. Next we examine the case where the population includes a diversity of strategies. We find that only the mean ‘discriminatoriness’ in the population is the parameter that affects the evolutionary dynamics. The discriminating strategy works as a promoter of cooperation there. However, it is again not the end point of the evolution. This is because retaliatory defection, which was prescribed by the discriminating strategy, is regarded as another defection toward the society. These results caution that we have to reconsider the role of retaliatory defection much more carefully.Keywords
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