REDUCTION WITHOUT REDUCTIONISM: A DEFENCE OF NAGEL ON CONNECTABILITY
- 22 February 2008
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Philosophical Quarterly
- Vol. 59 (234), 39-53
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.560.x
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 13 references indexed in Scilit:
- Explanatory Reduction, Conceptual Analysis, and Conceivability Arguments about the MindNoûs, 2002
- On Multiple Realization and the Special SciencesThe Journal of Philosophy, 2001
- Disjunctive Properties: Multiple RealizationsThe Journal of Philosophy, 2001
- Multiple RealizationsThe Journal of Philosophy, 2000
- Kinds, Complexity and Multiple realizationPhilosophical Studies, 1999
- The metaphysics of irreducibilityPhilosophical Studies, 1991
- Toward a Universal Law of Generalization for Psychological ScienceScience, 1987
- Reductionism and the nature of psychologyCognition, 1973
- Attribute-Identities in MicroreductionsThe Journal of Philosophy, 1972
- Approaches to ReductionPhilosophy of Science, 1967