A new axiomatization of the Shapley–solidarity value for games with a coalition structure
- 1 March 2018
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier BV in Operations Research Letters
- Vol. 46 (2), 163-167
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2017.12.006
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- National Natural Science Foundation of China (71231003)
- National Natural Science Foundation of China (71572040)
- Social Science Planning Project of Fujian (FJ2017C040)
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