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Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation
Home
Publications
Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation
Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation
LB
Lucian Arye Bebchuk
Lucian Arye Bebchuk
Jesse M. Fried
Jesse M. Fried
DW
David I. Walker
David I. Walker
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1 January 2002
journal article
Published by
JSTOR
in
The University of Chicago Law Review
Vol. 69
(3)
,
751
https://doi.org/10.2307/1600632
Abstract
This Article develops an account of the role and significance of managerial power and rent extraction in executive compensation. Under the optimal contracting a...
Keywords
OPTIMAL
CONTRACTING
ACCOUNT
RENT EXTRACTION
POWER AND RENT
MANAGERIAL POWER
EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION
All Articles
Open Access
Cited by 850 articles