Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt
Open Access
- 1 February 1998
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Vol. 113 (1), 1-41
- https://doi.org/10.1162/003355398555496
Abstract
We analyze the role of debt in persuading an entrepreneur to pay out cash flows, rather than to divert them. In the first part of the paper we study the optimal debt contract—specifically, the trade-off between the size of the loan and the repayment—under the assumption that some debt contract is optimal. In the second part we consider a more general class of (nondebt) contracts, and derive sufficient conditions for debt to be optimal among these.Keywords
Other Versions
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