Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief
Top Cited Papers
- 27 December 2012
- Vol. 48 (2), 193-218
- https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12006
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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