The Persistence of Corruption and Regulatory Compliance Failures: Theory and Evidence
- 1 December 2004
- journal article
- Published by Springer Science and Business Media LLC in Public Choice
- Vol. 121 (3-4), 363-390
- https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-004-1684-0
Abstract
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This publication has 31 references indexed in Scilit:
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