Scope of Auditors' Liability, Audit Quality, and Capital Investment
Preprint
- 1 January 2001
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier BV in SSRN Electronic Journal
- Vol. 7 (1), 97-122
- https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.277931
Abstract
One of the fundamental issues in the discussion of auditors' liability is to whom auditors should be held liable for ordinary negligence under common law. Three judicial viewpoints prevail: the restrictive privity approach, the more liberal Restatement approach, and the most liberal foreseeability approach. To compare these three approaches from an efficiency perspective, this paper develops a model that features an owner-managed firm, an independent auditor, a continuum of unrelated lenders, and an impartial court. Double effort-incentive problems appear for the firm and the auditor. The firm has an additional incentive problem due to the sequential nature of its borrowing. This paper shows that the effort-incentive problem and the sequential borrowing problem of the firm render unambiguous improvements in audit effort/quality, capital investment, and social welfare as the judicial approach governing the scope of auditors' liability becomes more conservative.This publication has 6 references indexed in Scilit:
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