Business as usual: interest group access and representation across policy-making venues
- 26 February 2013
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Public Policy
- Vol. 33 (1), 3-33
- https://doi.org/10.1017/s0143814x12000207
Abstract
We provide the first comprehensive study of lobbying across venues by studying interest group registrations in both the legislative and administrative branches. We present four major findings based on Federal and state data. Firstly, groups engage in substantial administrative lobbying relative to legislative lobbying. Secondly, the vast majority of groups lobby the legislature, but a large proportion of groups also lobby the bureaucracy. Thirdly, representational biases in legislative lobbying are replicated across venues: business groups dominate administrative lobbying at least as much as they do legislative lobbying. Finally, the level of interest group activity in one venue for a given policy area is strongly related to its level in the other venue. The findings potentially have important implications for the impact of institutional design on both the form and promotion of broad participation in policy-making as well as the ultimate content of policies chosen by democratic governments, broadly construed.Keywords
This publication has 45 references indexed in Scilit:
- The President's Playbook: White House Strategies for Lobbying CongressThe Journal of Politics, 2008
- Lobbying Bureaucrats*The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2006
- A Bias Towards Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on the U.S. BureaucracyThe Journal of Politics, 2006
- Drawing Lobbyists to Washington: Government Activity and the Demand for AdvocacyPolitical Research Quarterly, 2005
- Choosing Battlegrounds: Interest Group Lobbying Across Multiple VenuesPolitical Research Quarterly, 2003
- Interest Group Lobbying and the Delegation of Policy AuthorityEconomics & Politics, 2000
- The Lobbying Activities of Organized Interests in Federal Judicial NominationsThe Journal of Politics, 2000
- Inviting Friends to Lobby: Interest Groups, Ideological Bias, and Congressional CommitteesAmerican Journal of Political Science, 1997
- Information, access, and contributions: A signaling model of lobbyingPublic Choice, 1995
- Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the U.S. Supreme CourtAmerican Political Science Review, 1988