The influence of cognitive ability and instructional set on causal conditional inference
Open Access
- 1 May 2010
- journal article
- research article
- Published by SAGE Publications in The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology
- Vol. 63 (5), 892-909
- https://doi.org/10.1080/17470210903111821
Abstract
We report a large study in which participants are invited to draw inferences from causal conditional sentences with varying degrees of believability. General intelligence was measured, and participants were split into groups of high and low ability. Under strict deductive-reasoning instructions, it was observed that higher ability participants were significantly less influenced by prior belief than were those of lower ability. This effect disappeared, however, when pragmatic reasoning instructions were employed in a separate group. These findings are in accord with dual-process theories of reasoning. We also took detailed measures of beliefs in the conditional sentences used for the reasoning tasks. Statistical modelling showed that it is not belief in the conditional statement per se that is the causal factor, but rather correlates of it. Two different models of belief-based reasoning were found to fit the data according to the kind of instructions and the type of inference under consideration.This publication has 37 references indexed in Scilit:
- On the resolution of conflict in dual process theories of reasoningThinking & Reasoning, 2007
- Thinking about conditionals: A study of individual differencesMemory & Cognition, 2007
- Working memory and everyday conditional reasoning: Retrieval and inhibition of stored counterexamplesThinking & Reasoning, 2005
- Working memory and counterexample retrieval for causal conditionalsThinking & Reasoning, 2005
- Conditionals and conditional probability.Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 2003
- The Relative Contribution of Content and Context Factors on the Interpretation of ConditionalsExperimental Psychology, 2002
- Conditionals: A theory of meaning, pragmatics, and inference.Psychological Review, 2002
- The domain specificity and generality of belief bias: Searching for a generalizable critical thinking skill.Journal of Educational Psychology, 1999
- Reasoning independently of prior belief and individual differences in actively open-minded thinking.Journal of Educational Psychology, 1997
- Debiasing by instruction: The case of belief biasThe European Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 1994