An Efficient Game for Coordinating Electric Vehicle Charging
- 27 September 2016
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
- Vol. 62 (5), 2374-2389
- https://doi.org/10.1109/tac.2016.2614106
Abstract
A novel class of auction-based games is formulated to study coordination problems arising from charging a population of electric vehicles (EVs) over a finite horizon. To compete for energy allocation over the horizon, each individual EV submits a multidimensional bid, with the dimension equal to two times the number of time-steps in the horizon. Use of the progressive second price (PSP) auction mechanism ensures that incentive compatibility holds for the auction games. However, due to the cross elasticity of EVs over the charging horizon, the marginal valuation of an individual EV at a particular time is determined by both the demand at that time and the total demand over the entire horizon. This difficulty is addressed by partitioning the allowable set of bid profiles based on the total desired energy over the entire horizon. It is shown that the efficient bid profile over the charging horizon is a Nash equilibrium of the underlying auction game. An update mechanism for the auction game is designed. A numerical example demonstrates that the auction process converges to an efficient Nash equilibrium. The auction-based charging coordination scheme is adapted to a receding horizon formulation to account for disturbances and forecast uncertainty.Keywords
Funding Information
- National Natural Science Foundation (NNSF) of China (61174091)
- U.S. National Science Foundation (CNS-1238962)
This publication has 43 references indexed in Scilit:
- Cycle-life model for graphite-LiFePO4 cellsJournal of Power Sources, 2011
- Plug-in hybrid electric vehicle charge pattern optimization for energy cost and battery longevityJournal of Power Sources, 2011
- Analysis of a class of decentralized dynamical systems: rapid convergence and efficiency of dynamical quantized auctionsIMA Journal of Mathematical Control and Information, 2010
- Bidding Strategies for Electricity Producers in a Competitive Electricity MarketplaceIEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 2004
- Computational-mechanism design: a call to armsIEEE Intelligent Systems, 2003
- Overview of power management in hybrid electric vehiclesEnergy Conversion and Management, 2002
- Optimal bidding strategies and modeling of imperfect information among competitive generatorsIEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 2001
- Incentives in TeamsEconometrica, 1973
- Multipart pricing of public goodsPublic Choice, 1971
- Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed TendersThe Journal of Finance, 1961