SafeSpec
Top Cited Papers
- 2 June 2019
- conference paper
- conference paper
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
Abstract
Speculative attacks, such as Spectre and Meltdown, target speculative execution to access privileged data and leak it through a side-channel. In this paper, we introduce (SafeSpec), a new model for supporting speculation in a way that is immune to the side-channel leakage by storing side effects of speculative instructions in separate structures until they commit. Additionally, we address the possibility of a covert channel from speculative instructions to committed instructions before these instructions are committed. We develop a cycle accurate model of modified design of an x86-64 processor and show that the performance impact is negligible.Keywords
Funding Information
- Division of Computer and Network Systems (1422401,1619322,1619450,1718997)
- Office of Naval Research (N00014-17-1-2893)
This publication has 6 references indexed in Scilit:
- SafeSpecPublished by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) ,2019
- Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative ExecutionPublished by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) ,2019
- ret2specPublished by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) ,2018
- InvisiSpec: Making Speculative Execution Invisible in the Cache HierarchyPublished by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) ,2018
- BranchScopePublished by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) ,2018
- KASLR is Dead: Long Live KASLRLecture Notes in Computer Science, 2017