The Breakup of Nations: A Political Economy Analysis
- 1 November 1997
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Vol. 112 (4), 1057-1090
- https://doi.org/10.1162/003355300555420
Abstract
This paper develops a model of the breakup or unification of nations. In each nation the decision to separate is taken by majority voting. A basic trade-off between the efficiency gains of unification and the costs in terms of loss of control on political decisions is highlighted. The model emphasizes political conflicts over redistribution policies. The main results of the paper are i) when income distributions vary across regions and the efficiency gains from unification are small, separation occurs in equilibrium; and ii) when all factors of production are perfectly mobile, all incentives for separation disappear.Keywords
This publication has 12 references indexed in Scilit:
- On the Number and Size of NationsThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1997
- Equivalence of the Core and Competitive Equilibrium in a Tiebout Economy with Crowding TypesJournal of Urban Economics, 1997
- Taste-homogeneity of optimal jurisdictions in a Tiebout economy with crowding types and endogenous educational investment choicesRicerche Economiche, 1996
- Equity and Efficiency in Human Capital Investment: The Local ConnectionThe Review of Economic Studies, 1996
- Economic theories of the break-up and integration of nationsEuropean Economic Review, 1996
- On The Language InstinctPublished by American Psychological Association (APA) ,1994
- Mobility and RedistributionJournal of Political Economy, 1991
- A Critique of Tiebout's Theory of Local Public ExpendituresEconometrica, 1981
- Voting over income tax schedulesJournal of Public Economics, 1977
- Individual welfare, majority voting, and the properties of a linear income taxJournal of Public Economics, 1975