Testing for COVID-19: Willful Ignorance or Selfless Behavior?
Preprint
- 7 April 2020
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier BV in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
Widespread testing is key to controlling the spread of COVID-19. Should we worry, however, about self-selection bias in the voluntary testing for COVID-19? Evidence from the recent literature on willful ignorance says we probably should. Many people avoid free information that would reveal if they have cancer, or if they have Huntington’s disease. In the context of COVID-19, such willful ignorance can bias testing data gathered by health professionals. Further, willful ignorance has been shown to arise when selfish wants conflict with social benefits. Such conflicting emotions are probable for people who like people (those who truly value social interactions, the potential “super spreaders”), given that a positive test can lead to 14 days of self-isolation. Ignorance of whether they are infected may be blissful—a person can continue to pursue their private desire to interact with others, while ignoring the social impact from their potential disease spread. In this paper we design a survey in which participants (N=897) choose whether to take a costless COVID-19 test. We find that 70 percent would take a costless test. Surprisingly, the types of people most likely to widely spread COVID-19—the extraverts, others who meet more people in their daily lives, and younger people—are the most likely to get a costless test. People’s ability to financially sustain self-isolation does not matter to their decision. We conclude that people are selfless in their decision to test for COVID-19. Our results are encouraging—they imply that voluntary testing may succeed in targeting those who generate the largest social benefits from self-isolation if infected, which strengthens the case for widespread COVID-19 testing.This publication has 26 references indexed in Scilit:
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