Competing Auctions
- 1 March 2004
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 2 (1), 30-66
- https://doi.org/10.1162/154247604323015472
Abstract
This paper shows that larger auctions are more efficient than smaller ones, but that despite this scale effect, two competing and otherwise identical markets or auction sites of different sizes can coexist in equilibrium. We find that the range of equilibrium market sizes depends on the aggregate buyer‐seller ratio, and also whether the markets are especially thin. (JEL: D44, L11)Keywords
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