The effect of social categorization on cooperation in three types of social dilemmas

Abstract

The present study investigated whether cooperation in various social dilemmas could be promoted by categorizing subjects at a group level rather than at a personal level. Three types of games were employed, i.e. the Prisoner's Dilemma Game (PDG), the Chicken Dilemma Game (CDG) and the Trust Dilemma Game (TDG). Categorization level (Group vs. Personal) and Type of Game (PDG vs. CDG vs. TDG) constituted the 2 × 3 factorial design. As predicted from Social Identity Theory, Group Categorization elicited more cooperation than Personal Categorization. Additional data sustained a social identification interpretation. Second, it was investigated whether the rank order in cooperation among the three games, which were presented to the subjects in a lifelike format, would replicate the rank order observed in an abstract gaming study, and it did: in the PDG fewer cooperative choices were made than in the CDG, whereas in the CDG fewer cooperative choices were made than in the TDG.