An axiomatic theory of a risk dominance measure for bipolar games with linear incentives
- 1 January 1995
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier BV in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 8 (1), 213-263
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(05)80021-1
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 5 references indexed in Scilit:
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