Scientific Realism and the Stratagema de Divide et Impera
- 17 August 2006
- journal article
- Published by University of Chicago Press in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 57 (3), 537-560
- https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axl021
Abstract
In response to historical challenges, advocates of a sophisticated variant of scientific realism emphasize that theoretical systems can be divided into numerous constituents. Setting aside any epistemic commitment to the systems themselves, they maintain that we can justifiably believe those specific constituents that are deployed in key successful predictions. Stathis Psillos articulates an explicit criterion for discerning exactly which theoretical constituents qualify. I critique Psillos's criterion in detail. I then test the more general deployment realist intuition against a set of well-known historical cases, whose significance has, I contend, been overlooked. I conclude that this sophisticated form of realism remains threatened by the historical argument that prompted it.Keywords
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