Empirical Psychology, Naturalized Epistemology, and First Philosophy
- 1 December 1984
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 51 (4), 667-676
- https://doi.org/10.1086/289211
Abstract
In his 1983 article, Paul A. Roth defends the Quinean project of naturalized epistemology from the criticism presented in my 1980 article. In this note I would like to respond to Roth's effort. I will argue that, while helpful in advancing and clarifying the issues, Roth's defense of naturalized epistemology does not succeed. The primary topic to be clarified is Quine's “no first philosophy” doctrine; but I will address myself to other points as well.Keywords
This publication has 3 references indexed in Scilit:
- Siegel on Naturalized Epistemology and Natural SciencePhilosophy of Science, 1983
- Epistemic Merit, Intrinsic and InstrumentalProceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 1981
- Justification, Discovery and the Naturalizing of EpistemologyPhilosophy of Science, 1980