There is a body of literature, often identified as the sociology of knowledge, that includes the exploration of the ways by which interpersonal, group, and inter-group dynamics among scholars influence the development of scientific knowledge. (Bourdieu [Bourdieu, P. 1977. Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.], Feyerabend [Feyerabend, P. K. 1975. Against method. M. Radner, S. Winokur, eds. Analyses of Theories & Methods of Physics & Psychology. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. IV. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, MN.], Kaplan [Kaplan, A. 1964. The Conduct of Inquiry. Intext, New York.], Merton [Merton, Robert K. 1973. The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Emouval Investigations. University Press, Chicago, IL.], Mitroff [Mitroff, I. I. 1974. The Subjective Side of Science. Elsevier, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.], Watson [Watson, James D. 1969. The Double Helix. New American Library, New York.]). In the field of organization behavior, Herriot (Herriot, Peter. 1992. Selection: The two subcultures. Eur. Work and Organ. Psychologist 2(2) 129–140.) has examined how the psychometric subculture within organizational behavior can lead to its own demise and irrelevance. I propose to examine how the theories used and research conducted by scholars can feed back to make them unaware of gaps in their theories. I hope to show that these counterproductive consequences are tacit and taken for granted. These factors combine to inhibit the production of valid knowledge. I will focus primarily on my defenses as exhibited in my role in the development of the Theory of Action (TOA). I hope to illustrate that the assumptions and claims that I made, that only double-loop learning will lead to liberating alternatives and changing the status quo, were based on defensive reasoning. Defensive reasoning includes making premises and inference processes tacit; crafting conclusions in such a way that they are not falsifiable by reasoning external to the one used to create the conclusion. Such defensive reasoning not only produced gaps in the theory of which I was unaware. It also hindered seeing important connections with other relevant organizational theories, in this case the Behavioral Theory of the Firm (BTF). For the sake of comparison, I will also focus on the reasoning and research of a few leading scholars of BTF, primarily James March. I hope to show that he too, used defensive reasoning which made it unlikely that BTF scholars will see certain important gaps in BTF, and that, in turn, hindered seeing important connections with TOA. If my analysis is correct, these gaps are especially puzzling since both theories hold similar premises about the nature of organizational reality. For example, the human mind is a finite processing system; organizational life is often dominated by quasi-resolution of conflict and limited learning; that reality is constructed in the form of designs (Simon [Simon, Herbeit A. 1969. The Science of the Artificial. M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, MA.]) or life space (Lewin: see Cartwright [Cartwright, D., ed. 1951. Field Theory and Social Science. Harper & Bros., New York.], p. 19,511); and societal cultures are constructed with features that are consistent with the designs (Berger and Luckmann [Berger, P., T. Luckmann. 1967. The Social Construction of Reality. Doubleday, Garden City, NY.], Geertz [Geertz, C. 1973. The Interpretation of Cultures. Basic Books, New York.]). How is it that two theories that exhibit similar premises lead to significantly different if not, at times, antagonistic views about the alterability and changeability of the universe that each purports to represent?