Regulation and the Evolution of Corporate Boards: Monitoring, Advising, or Window Dressing?
- 1 April 2004
- journal article
- Published by University of Chicago Press in The Journal of Law and Economics
- Vol. 47 (1), 167-193
- https://doi.org/10.1086/380473
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 18 references indexed in Scilit:
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