Protective governance choices and the value of acquisition activity
- 1 December 2008
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier BV in Journal of Corporate Finance
- Vol. 14 (5), 550-566
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2008.09.011
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 44 references indexed in Scilit:
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