Base rates, stereotypes, and judgmental accuracy
- 1 March 1996
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 19 (1), 22-23
- https://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x00041236
Abstract
The base rate literature has an opposite twin in the social psychological literature on stereotypes, which concludes that people use their preexisting beliefs about probabilistic category attributes too much, rather than not enough. This ironic discrepancy arises because beliefs about category attributes enhance accuracy when the beliefs are accurate and diminish accuracy when they are not. To determine the accuracy of base rate/stereotype beliefs requires research that addresses specific content.Keywords
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