When Do Firms Prefer Individual Action to Collective Action in The Pursuit of Corporate Political Strategy? A New Perspective on Industry Concentration
- 1 April 2009
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Business and Politics
- Vol. 11 (1), 1-21
- https://doi.org/10.2202/1469-3569.1234
Abstract
In this study we advance the current research on corporate political strategy by examining how firms decide on their level of engagement in political action. This study proposes a contingency approach that identifies conditions in which firms prefer individual action to collective action in their pursuit of political strategy and introduces a framework that addresses this preference. Our results show that even in concentrated industries, a firm's preference of individual action over collective action varies when government contracts or research and development intensity are important considerations.Keywords
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