Credibility in Compliance and Punishment: Leader Specific Punishments and Credibility
- 1 May 2006
- journal article
- Published by University of Chicago Press in The Journal of Politics
- Vol. 68 (2), 248-258
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2006.00403.x
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 21 references indexed in Scilit:
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