On the Topic of the Divergence between Legal and Moral Obligations in Common Law
- 1 January 2012
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence
- Vol. 25 (1), 5-37
- https://doi.org/10.1017/s0841820900005312
Abstract
If common law is to run parallel to the morality of promissory obligation, it must require the breaching seller to keep his promise, not simply to pay off the buyer. However, in the event of promise-breaking, common law orders the defendant to compensate the claimant for the loss that flows from the breach of the duty to perform. The following questions then arise: why does English law not order the defendant to do the very thing that the substantive duty requires him to do? Why does it not adopt specific performance as the primary remedy? Is it because English law runs against the morality of promise? The answer is ‘no’. A number of justifications have been put forward to explain the common law’s reluctance to award specific performance despite its undoubted acceptance as the appropriate moral response to promise-breaking. This article will explain each and show which is more persuasive.Keywords
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