Preemption, leapfrogging and competition in patent races
- 1 June 1983
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier BV in European Economic Review
- Vol. 22 (1), 3-31
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0014-2921(83)90087-9
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 12 references indexed in Scilit:
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