The design of payment systems for physicians under global budget – an experimental study
- 1 February 1998
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier BV in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 34 (2), 295-311
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0167-2681(97)00052-8
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 11 references indexed in Scilit:
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