Reciprocity without commitment: Characterization and performance of informal insurance arrangements
- 28 February 1993
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier BV in Journal of Development Economics
- Vol. 40 (1), 1-24
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-3878(93)90102-s
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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