CEO compensation contagion: Evidence from an exogenous shock
- 1 February 2013
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier BV in Journal of Financial Economics
- Vol. 107 (2), 477-493
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.09.005
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 38 references indexed in Scilit:
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