Venture Capitalists as Principals: Contracting, Screening, and Monitoring
- 1 May 2001
- journal article
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Review
- Vol. 91 (2), 426-430
- https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.91.2.426
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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