Capital Structure and Corporate Control: The Effect of Antitakeover Statutes on Firm Leverage
- 1 April 1999
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Finance
- Vol. 54 (2), 519-546
- https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00116
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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