DEPNET: How to benefit from social dependence†
- 1 October 1995
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Informa UK Limited in The Journal of Mathematical Sociology
- Vol. 20 (2-3), 161-177
- https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250x.1995.9990160
Abstract
In this paper, two different views of sociality, one based upon interferences, and the other based upon complementarity, or interdependence, are confronted. The latter is shown to present a number of theoretical advantages over the former, allowing for an account of different types of social actions— influencing, exchange, cooperation—and of how these emerge from structural social conditions. A formal model of dependence relations is presented, and an algorithm for calculating the dependence networks and situations in a multi‐agent context is briefly shown. A simulator of dependence relations, which edits a set of agents (in terms of their goals, actions, and plans) and applies the algorithm to calculate their dependence relations relative to any given goal, is described, and its applications are discussed. Some elementary simulations are exemplified in order to illustrate the experimental application of the simulator in a two‐agent context. Future expansions of the simulator are finally discussed.Keywords
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